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as answered by its decision in Hanna v. Stedman,4 which held that
for the purposes of an action of interpleader, a debt is not a res
which permits an adjudication in rem, but rather requires in
personam jurisdiction of the parties., Thus the court held that
although the British subject's New York remedy was barred by
the statutory limitation of §51-a, defendant remained liable to
suit in sister states where it maintained assets and where different
periods of limitation were provided. The obvious fact that the
intent of §51-a was to protect New York debtors from double
liability, influenced the court's ultimate determination that the
defendant could apply for remission of the sum paid into court
and continue to defend the action.( The Court thus held 0. P. A.
§133, which provides for discharge of the debtor from liability upon
payment into court, inapplicable where, under §51-a, an indispensable party has failed to appear.7 The Court stated that the sole
purpose of the deposit of security was to protect plaintiff, and not
to discharge defendant from liability as in an action of interpleader. Thus §51-a was construed as a statute of limitation,
designed to protect New York debtors from double liability and
harassing suits. Where defendant has paid the money into court,
and where because a claimant does not appear, the danger of a
later suit in a foreign jurisdiction persists, the debtor is permitted
to defend on the ground that the indispensable party has not been
joined.
Power of a Court to Disqualify Attorneys
One of the inherent powers of all courts of record is the
power, in a proper case, to disqualify an attorney from appearing
in a matter pending before that court.8 For example, where an
attorney possesses privilezed information concerning an opposing
party the court may bar the attorney's appearance on the around
that the party's right fo a fair hearing may be preiudced' The
further power to discipline or suspend an attorney for professional
4. 230 N. Y. 326, 130 N. E. 566 (1921).
5. But see Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 288 N. Y. 342,
43 N. E. 2d 434 (1942) ; Note. 37 CoRN. L. Q. 533 (1952).
6. Bulletin #50

pp. 147-148 (1939) by Henry R. Fraser, Legislative Reporter

of the New York State Bar Assn.

7. C. P. A. § 133 reads: "A party bringing money into court pursuant to the direction of the court is discharged thereby from all further liability to the extent of the
money so paid."
8. Brozm v. Miller, 286 F. 944 (rI.

C. Cir., 1922).

9. Watson v. Watson, 171 Misc. 175, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 537 (Sup. Ct 1939).
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misconduct or crime is conferred by statute.10 In New York, jurisdiction of such matters is vested in the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court by Judiciary Law §90.11
A novel problem concerning the distinction between the power

to disqualify and the power to suspend was before the Court of

Appeals in Erie County Water Authority v. Western New York
Water Company.12 The question presented was whether an order
of the Erie County Court,. which denied a motion by the defendant
company to bar the appearance of plaintiff's attorney in a condemnation proceeding pending before that Court, was a valid
exercise of the Court's power or a futile attempt to rule on a
matter solely within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division.
Prior to the present litigation, counsel for the Authority had
served as an attorney for the Public Service Commission. In
that capacity he had represented the Commission in proceedings
against defendant company. He terminated his employment with
the Commission in order to accept a retainer from the Authority
to prosecute this condemnation action. When the ease came on
before the County Court, defendant moved to bar plaintiff's attorney from appearing. The grounds urged for granting the motion
were that the attorney possessed privileged information concerning defendant, which he gained while in the employ of the P. S. C.,
and that his appearance in this matter would be a violation of
Public Service Law §15's and Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association. 4 After a hearing
the County Court denied the motion in an opinion in which the
following question was asked: "Did Olmsted [plaintiff's attorney]
10. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487 (1928).
11. JuDiciARY LAw § 90 (2)

:

"The supreme court shall have power and control over attorneys and counsellorsat-law and all persons practicing or assuming to practice law, and the appellate division
of the supreme court in each department is authorized to censure, suspend from practice or remove from office any attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice as
such who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or
misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial tb the administration of justice** *"
12. 304 N. Y. 342, 107 N. E. 479 (1952).
13. PuByuc SEavicE LAw § 15 provides in part:
"Any employee or agent of the commission who divulges any fact or information
which may come to his knowledge during the course of any inspection or examination
of the property, accounts, records or memoranda of any person, corporation .or municipality subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, except insofar as he may be directed
to do so by the commission, or by a court or judge, or- authorized by law, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor."
14. CAoN 36 provides:
"A lawyer having once held public office or having been in the public employment, should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter
which he had investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ!'
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investigate or pass upon this matter while acting as an attorney
for the Public Service Commission?" The question was answered
negatively and Olmsted was granted leave to appear. The Appellate Division affirmed the order but solely on the ground that the
Countfy Court had n6 jurisdiction of the motion.1 5
The problem before the Court of Appeals was essentially one
of characterizing the order of the County Court. The defendant
argued that the proceedings below involved neither censure nor
suspension, but only disqualification in .a particular matter. A
majority of the Court found no basis for that position and instead
viewed fhe motion as an accusation of professional misconduct.
It held that if the order was predicated upon a decision as to the
merits of that accusation it was a futile attempt to exercise a
power vested in the Appellate Division. The dissent accepted
defendant's contention and held the view that this was not a disciplinary proceeding within the scope of Judiciary Law §90. The
minority felt that, although the motion reflected indirectly upon
counsel's professional conduct, it was incidental and not serious.
It appears that the error below resulted from the County
Court misapprehending the basis for exercising its power to
disqualify. Instead of confining itself to the question whether
Olmsted did possess privileged information, which might be used
to the defendant's prejudice, it made a finding as to the propriety
of his appearance under the Canons of Ethics. The holding here
makes it clear that such a question is cognizable only by the
Appellate Division under Judiciary Law §90. Although defendant's motion only asked disqualification in this particular action
it did not give the County Court the power to rule on a matter
over which the Appellate Division has exclusive jurisdiction.
Pleading-Liability of UnincorporatedAssociations
Under the common law, an unincorporated association is not
capable of suing or being sued in its common or association name.
Unlike a corporation, it has no existence apart from its members."
Nor is it a partnership; the distinction being that a partnership
is organized for monetary gain, whereas a voluntary association
is organized for moral, benevolent, social or political purposes.1
For that reason no authority to create personal liability is implied
15. Erie County Water Authority v. Western New York Water Company, 279
App. Div. 712, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 721 (4th Dep't 1951), cert. denied, 21 U. S. L. Week 3145.
16. Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N. Y. 353, 55 N. E. 919 (1900) ; Brown v. The
tant Episcopal Church, 8 F. 2d 149 (E.D. La. 1925) ; See note, 149 A.L.R. 510. Protes17. Lafonde v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 508 (1880).

